This article explores the relationship between ideas and interests in policy change by examining tobacco control in each country of the United Kingdom (UK). In all four, the moves towards further prohibition reflected international trends, with evidence of policy transfer and the virus-like spread of ideas which has shifted the way that tobacco is framed. However, there are notable differences in the development of policy in each territory. This reinforces conceptions of transfer in which the importation of policy is mediated by political systems. Differences in policy conditions, institutions and 'windows of opportunity', mean that our conclusions on the role and influence of interest groups, institutions and agenda-setting vary by territory, even within a member state. This suggests that a focus on an 'idea whose time has come' should be supplemented by careful analysis of the political context in which the idea was articulated and accepted.
INTRODUCTION
The 'messy' nature of policy making in the European Union (EU) necessitates the use of different explanatory models in different circumstances (Richardson, 2005) . Further, the trans-national nature of decision-making, combined with a complex agenda-setting process, suggests the need to focus significant attention on "ideas, knowledge and expertise, rather than pure 'interest'" (2005: 6 ). Kingdon's (1995) attempt to explain the power of ideas in the 'organised anarchy' of the United States (US) federal system is particularly relevant. Indeed, the phrase 'an idea whose time has come', which describes, 'an irresistible movement that sweeps over our politics and our society pushing aside everything that might stand in its path ' (1995: 1) may be more significant in the relatively complex EU system. An idea's 'time' comes hand in hand with receptivity to that idea within the political system, requiring the motive and opportunity of decision makers to translate ideas into policy (Lieberman, 2002) . Therefore, the more obstacles there are to that translation process (or constraints to the adoption of the same policies across the EU), then the more explanatory weight can be given to the role of ideas when policy transfer takes place. The relationship between ideas and interests is also relevant to individual member states, even when government and group relationships are relatively stable, the policy environment is less crowded and the agenda setting process appears to be more straightforward (such as in parliamentary systems). The common aim is to identify the adoption of one particular idea (at the expense of others) within a political process characterised by ambiguity (there are many ways to frame any policy problem), competition for attention (few problems reach the top of the agenda) and an imperfect selection process (new information is difficult to gather and subject to manipulation) (Zaharidis, 2003: 2-15) . The main thesis of this article is that the process of adopting simple ideas is remarkably complex even within parliamentary systems such as the UK.
Kingdon's model applies as much to individual member states as it does to the EU. EU tobacco policy highlights these issues well. Tobacco restrictions have caused smoking prevalence to fall since the post-war period and government (EU and member state) policy reflects and reinforces the 'denormalisation' of smoking (Studlar, 2007a: 1) .
However, the problems and delays experienced by the European Commission pursuing a tobacco advertising ban (Duina and Kurzer, 2004) and the patchy adoption of other measures across the EU (Joossens, 2007) demonstrate the difficulties in treating ideas as the sole explanatory factor. Tobacco control is not an 'irresistible movement'. While tobacco control was an 'idea whose time had come' there were important variations in the extent to which it affected different locales. Indeterminacy also existed in member states and, in the case of the UK, within the member state. This is demonstrated by the variable adoption of smoking in public places bans in the UK since devolution.
Tobacco control appears to be most strong in the UK. It leads the rest of Europe, scoring 93% based on measures identified by the World Health Organisation (WHO) (price of tobacco, smoking bans, advertising bans, health education, health warnings, treatment (Joossens, 2007) . The smoking ban in public places represents the 'missing piece in the jigsaw' (Action on Smoking and Health, ASH, 2007) and marks the UK's willingness to go far beyond the agenda set by the EU (the European Commission's Green Paper followed a year later). Further, although the responsibility for introducing a ban was devolved, and each government had the potential to go its own way, all four introduced comprehensive smoking bans by 2006 (with Scotland taking the lead). In turn, all four appeared to import the same comprehensive measures introduced by Ireland in 2004.
However, while policy transfer within the UK appeared to be uniform, there were significant variations in policy development. In Kingdon's (1995) terms, four different 'policy windows' opened up to allow similar policy change.
To demonstrate this argument the article focuses on one case study to highlight the complex decision making processes that may be missed in broader discussions. First, it identifies the global, virus-like spread of tobacco control ideas. Second, it identifies the relationship between ideas, their promotion and receptivity to them. Third, it describes Kingdon's 'policy windows' to highlight the idiosyncratic reasons for apparently similar policy developments in different countries. Finally, it applies Kingdon's theory to UK smoking bans by identifying four distinct policy windows through which the idea of tobacco control had to pass. Overall, it highlights a spectrum of ways to consider the effects of ideas: from a sense of inevitability ('irresistible movement') to a sense of randomness and unpredictability (the conditions for acceptance came together at the right time).
Policy Transfer and the Role of Ideas
Policy convergence refers to the evidence for similarities in policy across regions. This may be linked to a transfer of policy from one region to another. The transfer literature then extends to a series of questions, including: is transfer voluntary; which actors are involved; how much policy is transferred; and how do we explain variations in levels of transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996; Bennett, 1991; James and Lodge, 2003; Page, 2000; Rose, 1993; Stone, 1999) ? The starting point for discussion of tobacco policy transfer is therefore the evidence of similarities in policy. A common feature in the EU (and most developed countries) is that smoking behaviour has become 'denormalised' (Studlar, 2007a: 1) . In part this is caused by similar policy instruments:
Similar 'Successes'
 Most countries have warning labels on cigarette packets.
 Most have initiated health education campaigns since the mid-1960s.
 Most have advertising restrictions on TV and radio.
Similar 'Failures'
 The enforcement of age-related restrictions has been lax.
 There is still state support for tobacco growers in the US and EU.
Similar timing in the use of instruments
 Taxation as a major policy instrument has only been used in the past 20-30 years.
 Controls of smoking in public places have been more prominent recently (Studlar, 2004) As Feldman and Bayer (2004: 1) suggest, the driver for convergence has been increased acceptance of the scientific evidence on smoking and, more recently, passive smoking.
The post-war scientific debate on the links between smoking and illness was replaced by acceptance (at least in government) of the evidence but uncertainty about the need to act.
More recently, the debate has shifted to the question: 'what tobacco controls work best'? This suggests that tobacco control based on public health is an idea 'whose time has come'. The case of tobacco accords with most discussions of ideas in the literature, including:
 'Viruses' which 'mutate', take on a life of their own and infect political systems.
 Norms taken for granted, placing limits on policy debate.
 Competition to establish 'how the world works' and therefore what solutions are acceptable (Cairney, 2009a; Campbell, 2002; John, 1998; Richardson, 2000) .
The post-war history suggests that scientific knowledge infected the political system, destroying previously closed policy communities and altering the balance of power between participants (from tobacco companies to public health). This knowledge was promoted by an 'epistemic community' (or network of knowledge-based experts -Haas, 1992: 3) of doctors and public health officials providing the scientific basis for tobacco control, combining with a much broader 'advocacy coalition' (Sabatier, 1998) of antismoking interest groups, public officials and interested individuals (Farquharson, 2003; Cairney, 2007b) . The policy image was reframed (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993 ) from an issue of economic benefit (taxes and exports) and civil liberties to public health and the need to intervene (particularly when a new strain of the virus -scientific knowledge of passive smoking -was accepted by governments). This contributed to a new worldview on tobacco, with the idea of tobacco control taken for granted and the agenda shifting to solutions rather than problems (Cairney, 2007b) .
Limits to the Role of Ideas in Policy Transfer
However, the response has varied according to the 'vested economic interests, cultural practices, and political factors' of each country and there are significant time-lags between the proposal and acceptance of scientific knowledge and the introduction of solutions (Studlar, 2004; . This applies not only to Europe (13/30 countries tracked by Joossens 2007 achieved a tobacco control score above 50%), but also the UK which has a post-war history marked by poorly implemented voluntary agreements even when the scientific evidence was accepted by the government (for passive smoking the gap between acceptance and legislation was 8 years -Cairney, 2007b: 50; 53) . Therefore, few discussions treat ideas as the sole explanatory factor.
The successful promotion of ideas is one focus of 'punctuated equilibrium'. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that since decision makers, the media and the public all have limited resources (time, knowledge, attention) they cannot deal with the full range policy problems. So, they ignore most and promote few to the top of their agenda. This discussion of receptivity to ideas is key to an understanding of 'policy windows'.
According to Kingdon (1995) , policy change requires the coming together of problems (policy issues deemed to require attention), policies (ideas or solutions proposed by pressure participants) and politics (changes in the political system that affect the receptivity to ideas). While solutions already exist, their proponents must wait for the right opportunity to present them and have them adopted. This window of opportunity opens when:
Separate streams come together at critical times. A problem is recognized, a solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes it the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not severe (1995: 165-6) This treatment of ideas shifts the focus from an 'idea whose time has come' (suggesting inevitability, with the idea as the main source of explanation) to the need for a range of conditions to be satisfied before a policy will change (suggesting uncertainty, with the acceptance of the idea more important than the idea itself). As Lieberman (2002: 709) suggests:
An idea's time arrives not simply because the idea is compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political circumstances favour it. At those moments when a political idea finds persuasive expression among actors whose institutional position gives them both the motive and the opportunity to translate it into policy -then, and only then, can
we say that an idea has found a time (Lieberman, 2002: 709) .
Since a policy window does not stay open very long, an 'idea's time comes, but it also passes', particularly if the reasons for a particular level of attention to the policy problem fade before a coalition behind policy change can be mobilised (Kingdon, 1995: 169) .
Four Windows of Opportunity in the UK
The relevance to our case study is that while we can identify the strength and promotion of ideas, we know much less about the receptivity to ideas in particular circumstances.
To pursue Kingdon's model requires the identification of four distinct 'policy windows' which explain the motive and opportunity of decision makers to translate public healthdriven ideas into tobacco control policies. To this end, the article explores four main sources of explanation for tobacco policy change -institutions, public/ media opinion, pressure groups and policy transfer (see Studlar, 2007a) . It shows that in each country the explanatory power of each factor differed significantly. First, each devolved government was constrained by uncertain policy competence, while the role of parties within parliament was crucial in each country for different reasons. Second, each reacted differently to public and media opinion. Third, each experienced different levels of pressure group activity. Fourth, each reacted differently to international policy developments. Therefore, the nature of the 'window of opportunity' differed and in each country the rejection of further tobacco controls (in this form at this time) was a realistic prospect. These findings are based on 50 interviews with interest group, civil service and elected representatives from 2004-6 (as part of a broader project -300 interviews examining developments in public policy in the UK since devolution - Keating, Cairney and Hepburn, 2008) .
Policy Competence
Each devolved territory was uncertain about its ability to change policy. This is clearest in Northern Ireland since the decision to introduce a comprehensive ban was made by an English health minister in the Northern Ireland Office (Shaun Woodward), rather than the (suspended) Assembly, in October 2005. While the National Assembly for Wales (NAW) was the first body to signal its intention to introduce a ban (January 2003), it did not have the legislative capacity to do so. Although non-legislative solutions were mooted, none were likely to be effective. Therefore, Wales was not able to change policy until an enabling clause was passed under Westminster legislation (the Health Act 2006 which introduced England's ban).
While the Scottish Parliament was the first to act, its ability to legislate was uncertain.
The ban in Ireland is based on health and safety and employment law, while key debates in Westminster focussed on the health and safety of bar workers if pubs or private clubs were exempt from legislation. The decision for Northern Ireland was also framed as 'a policy about protecting workers' (Shaun Woodward, HC 485-III: 73, Q504), while the European Commission's (2007: 19) most likely action is to extend its directive on workplace safety and health (89/391/EEC). This was not a route available in Scotland since these are reserved issues set out in the concordat with the Health and Safety Executive and acknowledged in Scottish Executive documents (Cairney, 2006: 437-9 ).
This constrained policy development from 2002-3, with civil servants unwilling to discuss a smoking ban because they deemed it outside their competence (interview, British Medical Association Scotland, 2004) . Group frustration prompted greater support for a Member's Bill pursued by Scottish National Party MSP (Member of the Scottish Parliament) Stewart Maxwell. However, Maxwell also reports a feeling of constraint which is reflected in the extent of his bill (to devolved areas, such as where food is served) (interview, 2005) . Maxwell was advised never to mention workplaces in the same sentence as the legislation (to avoid legal challenges). A Scottish Executive minister also advised Maxwell that a 'Sewel motion' was necessary (a Sewel motion is passed by the Scottish Parliament to give Westminster consent to legislate in areas with devolved and reserved elements -Cairney, 2006 ). Yet, when the Scottish Executive decided to legislate, these problems dissolved. The legislation was framed in terms of public health measures and no significant legal challenges materialised. While this may be seen as Scottish Executive success in reframing its own boundaries in the face of UK ministerial opposition (Health Secretary John Reid was opposed to a comprehensive ban), such occurrences are rare (Cairney, 2006; . A better explanation is UK support:
Department of Health civil servants helped draft the Scottish legislation to make sure that it was 'watertight' (interview, Scottish Executive, 2004) . Therefore, the UK government influenced the final decision in all four countries. This qualifies discussions of transfer which stress the influence of the rest of the UK on English policy. There is a long tradition of campaigning 'clientelism' in the UK's Department of Health. In the past, when the tobacco policy community was dominated by the Treasury and Department of Trade and Industry, it would fund groups such as Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) to raise issues and criticise policy (Cairney, 2007b) . Now, this influence extends to the devolved territories, signalling a complex process of multi-level governance -the influence of devolved policies on the English agenda is furthered by (parts of) the UK government.
The Role of Parties and Parliament
The role of parliament varied in each country. Its role appeared to be most significant in While its findings were moot since the Executive had already decided to legislate, the attitudes of its members were known well in advance and there was a significant degree of cross-party support for the measures. This acted as a spur and a resource for Labour ministers looking for a 'big idea' and no longer worried about the party political effects of tobacco control during the 2005 UK elections (Cairney, 2007a ).
In England, there was no equivalent to the Scottish process. However, the role of Parliament was just as crucial (Cairney, 2007b) 
Public and Media Opinion
Public opinion became key battle ground for pressure participants pursuing different policy solutions. We can identify three main aspects:
1.
The use of different opinion polls or the selective use of the same data.
2.
The use of consultation documents rather than opinion polls to demonstrate support.
3.
The less precise feeling among decision-makers about changing levels of public opinion and the scope for change.
First, we see differences in emphasis according to the agenda pursued. Second, since surveys were so subject to manipulation, they could not provide a popular mandate for governments (particularly since the aim of many was to get ahead of and change attitudes). The alternative was to use consultations since they often exaggerated opinion (those most in favour were the most likely to respond). This was done first by the Scottish Executive which distributed 600,000 copies in June 2004 and received over 53,000 responses by October. The response suggested that 80% supported a smoking ban and 56% rejected any exemptions (see Cairney, 2007a: 84) . Consultation was also a key factor in Northern Ireland, with a strong pressure group and media campaign to highlight 
Pressure Participant Influence
We can identify three main phases of group-government relations. The immediate postwar phase shows domination by tobacco to the exclusion of public health, with a policy image related to the economic benefits (jobs, exports, government revenue) and minimal knowledge of the association between smoking and illness (Cairney, 2007b; Read, 1996; Taylor, 1984) . In the second phase, although this link was becoming established, the response was mediated by a policy monopoly and subject to minimal competition from public health groups. The organisation and funding of public health opposition was low and the economic benefits of smoking plus the assumption of personal responsibility for health underpinned government attitudes to policy. In the current phase, the socioeconomic basis for tobacco support has diminished, the evidence on passive smoking has reframed the policy image and public health groups are relatively organised, numerous and respected within government.
In each country we can see high degrees of cooperation among public health groups and the devotion of a disproportionate amount of lobbying time by key groups such as the British Medical Association (BMA). However, there is considerable variation in group strategy and influence.
In Executive's stance, they would appear to come round to the idea of a ban over time (interview, 2005) .
In England we see similar policy shifts resulting from a change in 'ownership'. In this case it shifted from the government to Parliament. Although the value of the Irish approach was accepted in all three devolved jurisdictions, John Reid initially ensured that the UK response was incremental. The argument was that England is bigger than any other country which has gone for a complete ban and the implementation would be more difficult (interview, Department of Health, 2006 In all four countries the propensity to transfer policy from Ireland appears to be the deciding factor. Yet, in each case the extent of transfer is unclear. First, a common feature of the transfer process is that governments look to international experience to legitimise their own aims (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 347) . While the Scottish Executive used Ireland, the UK Government chose the US. Second, although all four countries are geographically close to Ireland, it is only the devolved territories which engage regularly in learning with it. The size of England (and the attitude of its decision makers) leads to a search in bigger European countries or to the US (interview, Department of Health, 2006; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) . Third, the influence of the in England a shift in the opposite direction undermined a UK government commitment to incremental change. Further, by this time the pressure from decisions made in the rest of the UK were more significant than Ireland (Cairney, 2007b: 55) .
Discussion
The process of adopting apparently simple ideas is remarkably complex even when: (a) the political system does not appear to be as 'messy' as the EU or US; and (b) a relatively simple policy solution is available to transfer from another country. A full examination of the role of ideas requires the identification of 'windows of opportunity' when problem, policy and politics streams come together for short periods (Kingdon, 1995) . In our case study of smoking bans in the UK, this necessitates the identification of four distinct windows. These windows bear a family resemblance since two of the three 'streams' are very similar. The balance of power within government between public health and tobacco company interests (and therefore the power to frame the policy problem) and the policy solutions available (the status quo, partial ban, comprehensive ban) are common to each country. The difference comes in the politics stream which refers to the changes in the political system required to make attention to the problem and receptivity to one particular solution more likely.
In England we see that in the post-war period, health ministers were often marginalised by more powerful interests in the Treasury and Department of Trade and Industry who enjoyed a close relationship to tobacco companies (Cairney, 2007b show that devolution could 'make a difference' in the light of unfavourable comparisons (with England) of service delivery in the National Health Service (Cairney, 2007a) .
These factors, combined with the appearance of public opinion shift and the lack of opposition in the other parties, were exploited by an Executive minister personally committed to tobacco policy change.
The analysis of Wales suggests that the most crucial factor in Scotland was the scope for difference afforded by the devolution settlement. While we can identify a series of reasons for the NAW to support comprehensive legislation -an early debate which established the principle, a Welsh commitment to public health polices, a committee process which reinforced demands for change in the light of Irish experience, shifts in public opinion and the efforts of pressure participants to keep the issue high on the Welsh agenda -the window of opportunity remained closed for years and only opened when the issue was considered in Westminster. This contrasts to an extent with Northern Ireland, which appeared to have less scope for divergence following the suspension of political devolution, was characterised as the territory least likely to engage in significant health policy change (Greer, 2004) , and which visited the issue relatively late as part of a broader strategy on public health. Yet, the window was less sticky in Northern Ireland following the apparent success of policy in the South which contributed to a strong steer from public consultation, media coverage, group and party pressure. The role of the Northern Ireland minister as decision-maker (rather than the intermediary role performed by the Secretary of State for Wales and Northern Ireland) ensured that this swell of opinion could be translated to policy change in a way not possible in Wales.
This experience tells us two things about the role of ideas in policy transfer. First, Kingdon's discussion of 'an idea whose time has come' has a strong resonance. In all four countries the new knowledge associated with passive smoking and the Irish experience appears to be the most crucial factor enabling uniform policy change to take place within the UK. The influence of ideas associated with the smoking ban was strong and the promotion of these ideas within government was effective (in part since previous battles on tobacco control had already been won). This process has become increasingly significant to the EU, since similar changes are taking place throughout most member states (albeit at a slower rate -see Joossens, 2007) . The explanatory power of the role of ideas is that the same basic idea has persisted in slightly different forms and set the agenda throughout multiple political systems.
Second, an idea's 'time' comes hand in hand with receptivity even in cases where the influence of ideas is strong. Our explanation for the adoption of policy is incomplete without a detailed exploration of 'windows of opportunity' (Kingdon, 1995) . Although the same policy was adopted by four governments, the differences in timing, motive and opportunity were significant. Uniformity was not inevitable. Indeed, the problem with this line of reasoning is that we can only come to such conclusions after the fact. While convergent policy change may now seem inevitable, a more detailed analysis shows the dependence of policy change on a wide range of actors, institutions and factors which just happened to be common to each country in this case. In most other devolved UK policy areas this has not happened to the same degree and it is often difficult to identify a common idea at the heart of policy (Cairney, 2009b) . Further, since there is an almost infinite number of ideas which could rise to the top of the political agenda, we can usefully see the process as one of competition to dedicate political time to one idea at the expense of the rest. Therefore, a focus on the success of one idea exaggerates the role of ideas in general, since it ignores the failure of most others. In most developed countries, the post-war tobacco experience suggests that the idea took a long time in coming. There were significant time lags (often lasting decades) between the production, acceptance and use of scientific knowledge which undermine the picture of inevitable change. The international experience suggests that the idea has only become an irresistible force in some countries. Therefore, a focus on comparative policy windows reinforces the symbiotic relationship between ideas and interests. An idea's 'time' comes hand in hand with receptivity, requiring the motive and opportunity of decision makers to translate ideas into policy.
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